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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
EB\VIN U. ~IOSEH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
·ziox~s COOPERATIVE nlEBCAN-
TILE INSTITUTION, a corporation, 
and JOHN A. ROGEBS, 
Defendants a;nd Appellants. 
Case No. 
7148 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, referred to hereafter as plaintiff; sued 
appellants, who will be referred to hereafter as defend-
ants, to recover damages for injuries which he sustained 
in an automobile accident. The trial of the cause in the 
court below resulted in a verdict in plaintiff's favor and 
defendants have brought this appeal to secure a re-
versal of said judgn1ent. 
The accident occurred on the lOth day of October, 
194;') at approximately 7 :30 p.m. on U.S. Highway 91 
near what is known as the Black~mith's Fork River 
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Bridge, about ll/2 miles south of Logan, Utah (Tr. 18, 
14 30 31 86 87 98 177 195 197, 198, 228). Plain tifi' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
was driving his autonwbile toward Logan, Utah and 
defendant Rogers was driving the truck of defendant 
Z. C. M. I., his employer, southerly in the direction of 
Salt Lake City (Tr. 31, 32, 49, 177, 179, 197, 198, 274)~ 
The highway at the point of accident runs in a north-
easterly and southwesterly direction and at and near 
the point of accident ,was straight for a considerable 
distance (Ex. "D," "E" and "H;" Tr. 10, 11, 15, 33, 
54, 199). The collision between these two rnotor vehieles 
occurred Ojl that stretch of highway because one <Jf the 
drivers got over onto the wrong side of the road. 
It should here be pointed out and ernphasized that 
I I 
there is a sharp and direct conflict in the testimony as 
to which driver was at fault. Plaintiff and his wife and 
aunt, who were -riding with him, all testified that de-
. fendant Rogers 'vas at fault. On the other hand, Rogers, 
who was alone in1 the truck, is just as emphatic that 
plaintiff caused the accident by getting over into his 
lane of traffic (Tr. 34, 35, G3, 56, G7, ;>9, 60, 61, 87, 89, 
94,95,103,200,201). 
The conflict in the evidence is irreconcilable both 
upon the extent of damages and upon the question of 
liability. Since the finding of lia'bility and the extent of 
damages depended entirely upon the credibility of plain-
tiff and his witnesses, it was an abuse of discretion for 
the trial judge to deny a n,ew trial and prevent the pro-
duction of ne,:vly discovered evidence which, if believed 
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hy the jury, \vould have n1uch reduced the award of dmn-
age:' if liability were found or would have so ilnpaired the 
credibility of plaintiff and his wife as to result in a 
finding of no liability. 
\Ve will endeavor to show that the testimon~· of 
plaintiff, his wife and aunt put a strain upon the credu-
.lity of the jury which would have been too great if the 
newly discovered testimony had been presented to them. 
The testimony of the truck driver on the other hand was 
so strongly buttressed by the testilnony of disinterested 
witnesses that certainly 1naterial evidence impairing the 
credibility of plaintiff and minimizing the extent of the 
lamage "'uffered by him in the collision would probably 
change the result. This will be en1phasized especially in 
view of the personal relationship, acquaintance and ob-
vious interest and bias of plaintiff, members of his 
fmnily and close friends. 
Xotwithstanding plaintiff asked damages from the 
jury upon the basis of a permanently and seriously im-
pajred 1nen1ory, nevertheless he was willing to testify 
that he arrived at the scene of the accident about 7 :30 
p.m.; that it was after dark, that he was driving with 
hi~ ,dfe seated on his right and his wife's aunt seated 
in the right rear seat; that he was driving about 45 1niles 
per hour and he was listening to his radio (Tr. 32). 
Plaintiff claims that he first saw the approach of de-
fendant's truck when it was north of the bridge and 
he knew frmn the headlights that it was an approaching 
Y<'hicle. (Tr. 32). It was approximately a. block and a 
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half away when plaintiff first paid particular attention 
to it ( Tr. ~>-4:). Plaintiff noticed nothing peculiar about 
the approach of the truck until it came onto the bridge 
when he claiins the lights appeared to jerk to one side 
giving him the impression it had hit some object, though 
from that distance he was unable to say it actually hit 
anything ( Tr. 34, 55). Even then, by plain tiff's own 
statement, the truck continued to approach in a perfect-
ly normal manner all the way across the bridge \Vith 
nothing to indicate that anything was wrong until it 
had cmnpletely crossed the bridge. All of this time the 
truck aclrnittedly remained on its own proper side of the 
road (Tr. 34, 56). Plaintiff then claims that when the 
truck had cleared the bridge by 10 to 15 feet it suddenly, 
for no apparent reason at all, swerved over into his lane 
of travel when he was only 60 feet away from the point 
of impact. As suddenly as it swerved into his path it 
swerve<l back again so that the front end of the truck 
di(l not come in contact with plaintiff's car at all (Tr. 
35, 57, 58, Ex. "B "). 
Though plaintiff had, by his own adn1ission, but a 
split second to estimate distances, and although he 
claimed a seriously impaired memory, he contended that 
his own car was within two feet of the southeasterly edge 
of the pavement, but that the truck came over onto his 
side of the pavement a minimum of 5 feet and per-
haps as much as 10 feet (Tr. 59, 60, 61, 62). In a distance 
of 60 feet with plaintiff's car travelling 45 ~iles per hour 
and defendant's truck travelling 40 miles per hour (Tr. 
61. 62) plaintiff asserts t~at defendant's truck, which was 
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not a se1ni-trailer type (Tr. H)5, Ex ''F") did a veri-
table jack-knife nutneuver and was so manipulated by 
the driver that it could swerve sharpely over onto the 
highway from its own side of the road and be brought 
back so abruptly and suddenly that only the rear por-
tion of ~t collided with plaintiff's car (Tr. 62, gx. ''F"). 
Faye :.\[oser, wife of plaintiff and seated to his right 
on the front seat, testified to much the same effect as 
plaintiff and stated that after the truck swerved onto 
the side of the highway her husband was travelling on 
and then suddenly swerved back again, the rear of the 
truck presented the appearance of a signboard obstruct-
ing the path of plaintiff's car ('Tr. 87, 94, 95). 
~Irs. Coral Jones, ~irs. :Moser's aunt, seated in the 
_right rear seat (Tr. 32), admittedly reclining and with 
her eyes shut, if not dozing, states that upon a sudden 
exclmnation fron1 :.\frs. :Moser that a car was on plain-
tiff's side of the highway, opened her ,eyes only to o h-
serve that plaintiff's car was about to crash into a"' sign 
board" (Tr. 99). ~Irs. Jones never did see the front of 
defendant's truck because she still had her eyes closed 
Ydten it went past where she was sitting and she did not 
know even then that it was a truck. The ilnpact was so 
sudden that .:\f rs. Jones did not even have time to be-
rnnle :-;tartled by what was happening ('Tr. 103). In 
spite of this situation, ~frs. J on~s 1nakes the claim that 
plaintiff was on the right side of the highway. 
On the other hand, Rogers, driver of the truck and 
co-defendant, testified that he first paid particular at-
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tention to the approach of plaintiff's car when it was 
frorr1 200 to 300 feet away. He was driving the truck on 
his own side of the highway and denied emphatically 
that he hit the end of the bridge in driving ?nto it ( Tr. 
199). As Rogers drov,e onto the bridge, he noticed plain-
tiff's car edge over onto his side of the highway. It 
gradually edged over the center line and when he was 
approximately half way across it became apparent to 
him that plaintiff's car wasn't going to get back over 
on its own side. Thereupon Rogers drove over to the 
right side as far as he possibly could and scraped the 
right bridge rail (Tr. 200, 209). As soon as the truck 
cleared the bridge, Rogers got the right wheels out onto 
the right shoulder (Tr. 201) where they rerrl'ained until 
the truck finally rolled into the barrow pit following 
the collision. 
Plaintiff's car hit the truck just in front of the left 
rear wheels (Tr. 202). Rogers fixes the point of impact 
at 35 to 40 feet southwest of the bridge (Tr. 208, 211). 
After the impact the truck continued along the right 
shoulder of the highway at a slight angle and finally 
cmne to rest in the barrow pit 117 feet south of the bridge 
on its own right side of the highway (Tr. 201). 
Plaintiff was unable to state the position of the ve-
hicles after the impact. Neither did Mrs. Moser testify 
where the plaintiff's car was situated upon the high-
way CTr. 90). Plaintiff was rendered unconscious by the 
accident and clairned he knew nothing of events which 
occurred for several days thereafter (Tr. 36, 100). :Mrs. 
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Jones clai1ns to have noted that plaintiff's car was not 
over the center line of the highway after the accident 
( Tr. 101 ), but her biased observation, made in a m01nent 
of great excite1nent, was in conflict 'vith physical 1narks 
left by the vehicles and the testimony of numerous dis-
interested witnesses. 
Defendant Rogers was not seriously hurt b~· the 
. accident. He was able to disengage'himself from the front 
~eat of his truck and came up onto the highway and made 
observations of the scene of the collision. He noticed 
plaintiff's car with its front end two feet over the yellow 
or center line on his side of the road ('Tr. 202). He fol-
lowed the tracks made by his truck fron1 the point where 
it was overturned in the barrow pit to the southwest 
corner of the bridge. These tire marks were c.Iear and 
distinct and were upon the right shoulder of the highwa~· 
(Tr. 202). He examined the marks on the right side of 
the bridge, which were 18 to 20 feet long on the right 
rail, and which continued to the southwest corner of the 
bridge (Tr. 203, 204, Ex. "E"). Rogers was emphatic in 
his denial that he encroached upon plaintiff's side of 
the highway (Tr. 201). 
Lt. Da~·, an Army doctor, and his companions were 
following defendant's truck (Tr. 179). He traveled in 
that position for a considerable distance and until after 
the accident. He testified positive!~, that defendant's 
truck did not get onto the· wrong side of the highway 
(Tr. 182, 191). After the accident, Lt. Day observed the 
position of plaintiff's car and testified that the ·front. 
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end of it was over the center line of the highway on the 
side of defendant's truck, as much as 2 to ~) feet (Tr. 
181, i82, 189). According to Lt. Day, the .;..loser car was 
about 60 feet fron1 the bridge (Tr.180). 
Officer Ree8e, highway patrolrnan for the State of 
Utah, was upon the scene of the accident a few minutes 
after it happened (Tr .. 228). He investigated the ac-
cident very thoroughly and his examination showed that 
the front end of plaintiff's car was about two feet uver 
the center line of the highway in the travelled portion 
thereof in which defendant's truck had been travelling 
(Tr. 229). According to Officer Reese, the automobile 
wa~ standing about 50 feet south of the bridge in the 
approxiumte center of the road, the left front wheel 
over the center line (Tr. 230). No skid 1narks from the 
application of brakes were found upon the higlnva:~, and 
the impact occurred about where plaintiff's car was 
standing after the collision (Tr. 231). Officer Reese was 
able. to trace the path of the truck from the point where 
it left the bridge to the place where it came to rest in· 
the barrow pit on the right side of the highway. He made 
positive identification of this tire mark by comparing it 
with the tire tread on the right front wheel of the truck 
(Tr. 233 to 236, 253, 254). This inspection proved beyond 
doubt that defendant's truck remained at all ti1nes on its 
side of the highway ('Tr. 237). In all of his testimony, 
Officer Reese is corroborated by Officer Gray of Logan 
City (Tr. 260, 261, 263, 264). Officer Edwards of Logan 
City was also at the scene of the accident, and while he 
did not conduct or make the measurements and the in-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
Ye~tip1tion that wa~ 1nade b~· officers Heese and (; rny, 
he neYerthelet>s noted the location of the plaintiff's ear 
in the center of the highway (Tr. 272, 27:3). 
In an atten1pt to support his own testiinony that 
defendant ·s truck violated his side of the highway, and 
the state1nents of his wife and aunt to the san1e effect, 
plaintiff produced the witnesses Blaine :Moser, his 
nephew (Tr. 71), :3Ir. Hickn1an, a life insurance sales-
man (Tr. 105), ~fr. :.JicMurdie, a friend (Tr. 147) and 
:Jfr. Haws, still another close friend (Tr. 165). Those 
,\-itnesses did not visit the scene of the colli'Sion to 1nake 
observations until the next day (Tr. 72, 105, 148, 165). 
"\Vhen they arrived there, plaintiff's automo·bile had been 
removed frmn the scene, all the debris left upon the 
highway by the collision had been swept up and de-
posited on the easterly si(le of the high·way, and de-
fendant's truck had been righted upon its wheels in the 
barrow pit by the use of heavy road equipment and 
numerous automobiles had passed the scene of the ac-
cident (Tr. 230, 232, Ex. "D," 246, 247, 249, 262, 263, 
205, 237' 238, 260, 244, 228, 185). 
Under these circumstances, Blaine ~foser, Hickman, 
'J f~)Iurdie and Haws set about to reconstruct the hap-
penings of the previous night. They testified that certain 
wheel tracks were found upon the highway which led in 
the direction of the truck from a point where they found 
debri~ and auto parts upon the easterly side of the high-
way. Apparently they ·were innocently deceived by the 
faet that the debris had been ren1oved from the place of 
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impact to the southeast side of the high\vay. They there-
fore erroneously assumed that this debris ~'as still at the 
place where the collision had occurred, not knowing at 
the time of their visit that it had ,been earlier swept up 
and placed where they found it the next morning ( Tr. 
72, 75,, 79, 106, 111, 150, 151, 154, 159, Ex. '' D,'' 160, 
167, 169, 170). 
Both ~lc~l urdie and Haws admitted that if their as-
sumptions with respect to the location of the debris were 
erroneous then their conclusions as to the point of im-
pact would necessatily be incorrect (Tr. 163, 172). There 
was no testimony by any of these four witnesses which 
identified the wheel mnrks which they saw the next day 
as those which the truck had Inade. 
Further com1nent upon this phase of the evidence 
will be res·erved for appellant's argument. It is neces- -
sary, however, to call atte~tion to other matters of evi-
dence upon which appellants rely for a reversal. This 
evidence goes not alone to the credibility of plaintiff's 
testimony, which we submit is seriously affected thereby, 
but also to the question of damages. 
Plaintiff testified that he sustained severe head . 
injuries in the accident which rendered him unconscious 
(Tr. 36, 38). His aunt, Mrs. Jones, confirms his un-
conscious state ( Tr. 100). For several days plaintiff 
claims he had no recollection of ev·ents around him (Tr. 
36, 63). His physician attested to his mental confusion 
(Tr. 125, 136, 137), and stated further that plaintiff 
sustained a severe concussion of the brain (Tr. 134). 
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As a direct result of these head injuries it was claimed 
by plaintiff and his doctor that plaintiff can1e out of the 
accident with a pern1antly ilnpaired ability to rernemher. 
This condition was n1anifested by an inability to recall 
the faces of old and fan1iliar friends; to retain in menl-
ory data having to do with his work without writing it 
down ( Tr. 4 7, 134, 145, 146, 14 7). He was characterized 
by his physician as a man with a "foggy memory" (Tr. 
145). 
It is quite evident that the references made to the 
injury to the brain and the consequential loss of mernory 
was for the purpose of inducing the jury to enhance the 
plaintiff's verdict. If the damage in this respect was 
over-emphasized for this purpose, defendants submit that 
the same te1nptation prompted plaintiff and his wife and 
aunt to color the events of the accident and such state~ 
1nents n1ust of necessity be examined with great care on 
the aspect of their credibility. If on the other hand, the 
damage to plaintiff's memory was all that was claimed 
:-:o that he cannot remember the names and faces of old 
and fan1iliar friends, then how can credit be given to his 
state1nent that he remembers clearly the events of the 
accident so as to definitely state that defendant's truck 
was on the wrong side of the road? Either way one looks 
at it, the reliability of plaintiff's testimony is open to 
serious question. Plaintiff's physician ·related how lm;s 
of consciousness obliterates the mernory of events which 
occur previous to the unconsciousness (Tr. 136, 137). 
Furthern1ore, part of the testimony of plaintiff and 
his physician was devoted to detailing very severe in-
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juries to plaintiff's left knee, ankle and shoulder. rrhese 
injuries \Vere described not only as serious, but as penn-
anent in their nature (Tr. 43, 45, 46, 128, 131, 133, 134, 
142, 143). Here again the jury was invited to enhance 
the verdict in plaintiff's favor. Just how n1uch thi:::; 
testimony enhanced the amount of the verdict, of course, 
no one can tell, but from the size of it, it may be properly 
assumed that this evidence had its effect. The verdict 
was unusually large, being for over $34,000.00. 
After judgrnent was entered on the verdict, defend-. 
ants moved for a new trial specifying among other 
grounds the discovery of n~w evidence . ( r:rr. 304). In 
support of this· nwtion, defendants filed two affidavits 
reciting that after the trial had ended ·evidence which 
defendants and their counsel had not known about and 
which could not have been discovered by the exercise of 
diligence had been discovered to the effect that plaintiff 
in .1941 and 1946 had been involved in accidents in which 
his left knee, ankle and shoulder had been injured, and 
that for the accident which occurred in 1941 he received 
-
certain insurance benefits, and further that the injury 
to the ankle and knee occurring in ·1941 had been rated 
by his insurance carrier as permanent. The affida-vits 
further recite.d that as late -as April 6, 1946 (six nwnths 
after the collision here involved) plaintiff had made 
statements that he was then suffering no disability by. 
reason of injuries to his' left knee and ankle (Tr. 305-
315). 
During the trial, plaintiff, his wife and physician 
eon cealed the fact of previous injury and its permanent 
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nature, and the jury was permitted to inelude in its 
Yerdict some dmnage for injuries frmn which .the affi-
~.laYits Inake it appear plaintiff had been suffering sinee 
1941 and which were in no wa~· connected with the eol-
iision with defendant's truck on October 10, 1945, and 
furthennore that after October 10, 1943 plaintiff claimed 
he had received injuries to the left leg, knee and shoulder 
in a bus accident which occurred shortly before the trial. 
It is c;ontended by defendants that they are en-
titled to haYe a jury pass upon this evidence, not only 
for its i1npeaching effect upon the evidence of plain-
tiff, his wife and doctor, but also because of its effect 
upon the question of what damages, if any, plaintiff is 
entitled to receive. 
STATEM-ENT OF ERRORS 
1. The court erred in overruling and denying de-
endants "Jiotion for New Trial, which is as follows: 
To the abore named pla.imtiff, and 
To L. E. X PI son and Samuel J. Ca.rter, his attorneys: 
You, and each of you, will please take notice 
that the defendant intends to 1nove the court to 
vacate and set aside the verdict rendered in the 
above cause, and to grant a new trial of said cause, 
upon the following grounds, to-wit: 
1. Irregularity in the proceeding·s of the 
eourt, jury or adverse pai'ty, abuse of discretion 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14: 
by the court which pr·evented the defendants from 
having a fair trial. 
2. ~1:isconduct of the jury. 
3. Accident or surprise which ordinary pru-
dence could not have guarded against. 
4. Excessive damages appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice. 
5. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or decision, and that it is against the 
law. 
6. Error in law occuring at the trial and 
excepted to by the defendants. 
7. Newly discovered evidence material for 
the defendant which it could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at the 
trial. 
This motion is made upon the minutes and 
records of the court and upon affidavits here-
after to be filed. 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 
Attormeys for D·efendants 
(Tr. 304) 
2. The court erred in refu~ing to give defendants' 
requ_ested instruction No. 1, which was as follows: 
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You are instructed that defendants are not 
required to explain how or why the collision in-
Yolved in this case occurred. The burden is upon 
the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of all 
of the evidence that the collision resulted fr01n 
the negligence of the defendant. (R. 33) 
ARGU~:fENT 
.Assign1nent of E.rror No. 1: 
It is the earnest contention of defendants that their 
Inotion for new trial should have been granted upon two 
grounds: 
1. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the ver-
diet. 
·) X ewly discovered evidence material for the de-
fendants which they could not, with reasonable diligence, 
haYe discovered and produced at the trial. 
1\,.. e shall discuss these two points in the reverse 
order named. 
In support of the ground stated in their motion of 
newly discovered evidence, defendants filed two affi-
davits (Tr. 304-315). These affidavits set out fully the 
newly discovered evidence relied upon and the time and 
manner of its discovery. Briefly summarized, the affi-
davits are to the following effect: 
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Coun-sel for defendants first learned of so1ne of the 
e~idence on Septe1nber- 20, 1946, the day after the con-
clusion of the trial and the balance of it about September 
' 30, 1946. Defendants the~selves had n~ knowledge re-
garding it prior to that time. This evidence, if produced 
in court, would show that in December 1941 plaintiff was 
the owner of a policy of accident insurance in the North 
Ainerican Accident Insurance Company of Chicago, Il-
' linois. On Decen1ber 26, 1941 plaintiff injured his left 
knee and ankle in a skiing accident. The ankle was 
sprained and the internal semilunar cartilage of the knee 
was fractured. Plaintiff called upon his insurance carrier 
for payment of the benefits provided by the policy and 
received those benefits. The insurance carrier required 
reports from plaintiff and his attending physician con-
cerning these injuries and written reports were made to 
the company. The reports disclosed that plaintiff was 
totally disabled on account of his injuries from December 
I 
26, 1941 until January 3, 1942. Fron1 January 3, 1942 until 
April 22, 1942 when plaintiff's physician reported to 
the insurance company, plaintiff was still partially dis-
abled, and the physician reported o~ April 22, 1942 
that disabilit)~ would not be entirely removed for an 
additional thirty days. From the 31st of January, 1942 
until about the middle of March, 1942, plaintiff's left 
leg wa~ in a cast and he was still using crutches on April 
22, 1942. 
The physician who attended plaintiff was the same 
one who testified on his behalf at the trial of this case 
' 
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and he it was who reported to plaintiff's insurance cmn-
pany. 
On April 22, 1942, when a final s·ettlement was made 
with plaintiff for his skiing injuries, the insurance com-
pany endorsed the policy excluding liability for any 
future injuries which plaintiff might sustain to his left 
knee and ankle upon the ground that said knee and ankle 
,..-ere pennanently impaired. · 
The affidavits further recite that after plaintiff was 
injured in the collision 'with defendant's truck on October 
10, 1945, he again called upon North An1erican Accident 
Insurance Company for benefit payments under his 
policy. In connection with his second claim, the age~t of 
the insurance company called upon plaintiff to ascertain 
the nature and extent of his injuries. In discussing these 
later injuries, plaintiff was asked if he was not claiming 
injuries. to his left knee and ankle. On April 6, 1946, ac-
cording to the affidavit, plaintiff was again asked -if he 
was not claiming injuries to his left knee and ankle and 
he denied that he was then suffering from such injury. 
At that time he further gave the insurance agent a 
de1nonstration of his abilit~- to flex and use his knee ancl 
ankle. 
In addition to the foregoing, one of the affidavits dis-
closed that on August 22, 1946, just about three weeks 
before the trial of this case, plaintiff was a passenger on 
a bus of the Union Pacific Stages and was in an accident 
on tha,t day in which he clain1ed his left leg and shoulder 
and neck had been injured. A settlement was made with 
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plaintiff by the Union Pacific Stages on August 2-t, 
1946, and at that tirne he exhibited· a 'badly swollen left 
ankle and clain1ed injuries to his neck and shoulders from 
the bus accident which happened August 22, 1946. 
Several counter-affidavits were filed on behalf of 
plaintiff (Tr. 316-326). In the counter-affidavits it i8 
clailned that plaintiff recovered entirely from his 1941 
injuries and on October 10, 1945 was suffering no dis- . 
ability on account thereof. It is further denied by plain-
tiff that he made any representations to. the agent of 
North A1nerican Accident Insurance Company in :March 
and April of 1946 to the effect that at that time he had 
no disability of his left knee and ankle, also that he re-
ceived no injuries in the bus accident in August 1946. 
In plaintiff's counter-affidavits it is admitted that 
plaintiff was injured in a skiing accident in December 
1941 and that the disability lasted until May 22, 1942. It 
is also not denied by the counter-affidavits that plaintiff 
was involved in the bus accident which occurred in Au-
gust 1946, and it is stated in plaintiff's counter-affidavits 
that he was paid dan1ages by the Union Pacific Rail-
road. 
\ V e can only speculate upon the reasons which led 
the trial court to rule as he did upon the affidavits of 
newly discovered evidence. No reasons for the ruling· 
were given at the time it was made. Perhaps the court 
was convinced that this evidence, even if it had been 
presented at the trial, would have made no su'bstantial 
difference in the verdict. The court 1nay have been of 
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the opinion that the jury would not have believed this 
t•Yidenee, or that its effect would have been entirely 
neutralized by the plaintiff's evidence in rebuttal. It 
\\-a~. however, not the prerogative of the trial court to 
pass upon the effect of this evidence or its credibility. 
If it 'vas con1petent for any purpose, and we submit that 
it was, then defendants were entitled to have it pre-
sented to a jury. 
The rule of law which the trial court is bound to 
apply in considering affidavits of newly discovered evi-
dence i~ stated in the case of Jensen vs. Logan City, 89 
Utah 34 7. 37 Pac. 2d 708, in which this court said : 
"K )Tin an denies that Jeppson talked with 
him, but the jury should be allowed to choose 
whom to believe.'' 
In the Jensen case this court had before it for considera-
tion affidavits and counter-affidavits of newly discovered 
evidence in connection with a motion for new trial. 
In Wood vs. Woo,d, Ky., 65 S.W. 2d 969, this lan-
guage is used : 
''The improbability of the witness' testimony 
is strongly and ably argued, but we are not now 
concerned with that phase of the case. If the 
statements of the witness be true, and that is a 
question for the jury, his evidence of the execu-
tion and the contents of the will was sufficient to 
suppl~' the missing link in the evidence heard on 
the trial, and require the suh1nission of the case 
to a jury. As there was no other evidence to the 
same effeet, it necessarily results that the newly 
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discovered evidence was of such a decisive and 
controlling character as would probably chall:ge 
the result, and therefor,e sufficient to requue 
a new trial. * * * * '' 
vV e have alr·eady pointed out the great stress and 
emphasis which plaintiff and his doctor placed upon the 
injuries to the left knee, ankle and shoulder in a bid to 
the jury to increase plaintiff's damages. The evidence 
c0ver·ed by defendant's affidavits went dir;ectly to the 
question of that damage and whether it had all been 
sustained by plaintiff in his accident with defendant's 
truck. A jury. might well have been convinced that plain-
tiff became· involved in the accident with defendants in 
an already impaired physical condition, and according-
ly minimized by a substantial sum the amolint of the 
verdict. 
Plaintiff was willing to claim a seriously and perma-
nently impaired memory for the purpose of increasing 
his damages, while at the same time claiming the keenest 
of memories for the purpose of fixing liability. Such a 
person would find no difficulty in denying injury to his ' · 
knee and ankle for the purpos·e of bringing hi~self 
withi~ the provisions of an insurance policy while claim-
ing the exact opposite before court and jury. 
rrhe jury would have an absolute right, to believe 
C. A. Thomas and to disbelieve plaintiff and his doctor. 
The trial court may not dictate to a jury which witness·es 
it should choose to believe. Jensen vs. Logan City, supra; 
IVo·od vs. Wood, supra. 
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The matters covered by the affidavits also raise a 
serious question of plaintiff's credibility as well as the 
eredibility of his wife and doctor. At the trial no hint· 
\Hls given that plaintiff had been previously injured or 
that he mig·ht have been suffering from the effect of those 
injuries on October 10, 1945. No hint or suggestion was 
given of another accident just three weeks prior to the 
trial of the case which was of sufficient seriousness to 
justify a payment of damages to plaintiff. Defendants, 
the court and jury were positively led to believe and · 
understand that all damages claimed by plaintiff began 
on October 10, 1945 and that he had suffered no other 
injuries after that time and prior to the trial. If the 
newly discovered evidence covered by defendant's af-
fidavits had been available to defendants at the trial, 
its effect as impeachment of plaintiff's case might well 
have been devastating. If true, the jury might have been 
convinced that plaintiff, his wife and doctor were not 
\vorthy of belief on any aspect of the case. Defendants 
were entitled to the full impeaching effect of that evi-
denoo. 
Questions involving newly discovered evidence have 
been before this court in several cases. In general·it may 
he said that four ·elements, if found to exist, are suffi-
cient to support a new trial based upon a showing of 
such evidence. Those elements are: (1) diligence in se-
curing the evidence before trial; (2 and _3) that such 
evidence is more than cumulative and impeaching in its 
effect; and (4) that it is material and likely to change 
the result. These pri~ciples are accepted and referred t~ 
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in the following cases: Klopenstine vs. H,ays, 20 Utah 
45; Trimble vs Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 
Pac. 2d 674; Jensen vs. Logan Cty, supra; Vwn Dyke 
vs. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 161 Pac. 50. See 
also WDod vs. Wood, supra. 
The evidence shown to exist b);: defendants' affida-
vits was not cumulative. It was strongly impeaching 
\ 
in character, as we have herein pointed out, but in ad-
dition it was material on t~e very questions of damage 
and liability. Furthermore, this evidence, if presented to 
a jury, would have probably changed the result of this 
case ·in defendants' favor. Finally, the affidavits show 
that defendants first became aware of the existence of 
the new evidence after the trial and that they had no 
reasonable opportunity for knowing Qf its exis~ence be-
fore the date of its actual discov·ery. Unless this oppor-
tunity is given to the defendants to present ·to a jury evi-
dence newly discovered after the trial,· it will be impos-
sible to ·say that this cas·e was decided upon all of the 
facts and evidence which bear upon it. 
It is the function of courts to see that justice is done 
between litigants and that each shall have full oppor-
tunity to be heard upon all the evidence which is material 
and competent to a fair and·just decision on the merits. 
Whenever it is made to appear that litigants before a 
court have not had a fair and impartial trial and that 
justice has not been done, it is the duty of such court 
to grant a new trial. Denial of a new trial under such 
circumstances is an abuse of discretion demanding re-
versal of the judgment. 
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· · \Yhile the granting or refusing of the n1o-
tion (n1otion for new trial) lies in the sound dis-
cretion of the court, where there is grave sus~ 
picion that justice may have miscarried because of 
lack of enlightenment on a vital point which new 
evidence will apparently supply, and the other 
ele1nents attendant on obtaining a new trial on 
the ground of newly discovered evidence are pres-
ent, it would be an abuse of sound discretion not 
to grant the same. '' 
(Jensen vs. Logan City, supra) 
'Vhen a verdict is against the gr,eat weight of the 
eYidence it is the trial court's right and duty to set the 
Yerdict a~ide and grant a new trial. If in such case he 
fails to do so he has abused his discretion. 
In Valiotis vs. Ut,ah Apex Mitn. Oo., 55 Utah 151, 
194 Pac. 802, this court said : 
"It is undoubtedly true, as counsel for appel-
lant contend, that the trial judge may and should 
set aside a ¥erdict for insufficiency of the evi-
dence and grant a new trial, whenever in his· 
judgment the verdict is clearly and palpably 
against the weight of the evidence. Not to do so 
would be an abus,e of his discr~tion. * * * * 
"If it should appear that the evidence on 
which the verdict is based is so incredible or in-
herently improbable or so inconsistent with or 
contrary to natural laws or physical facts as 
to impel but the one conclusion that the verdict 
is the result of mistake, prejudice, or passion, 
we 1night then very properly say that the verdict 
is not supported by substantial evidence, or that 
there is not a substantial conflict of evidence, and 
therefore the lower court abused its discretion or 
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a case we look into the evidence, examine its legal 
effect, and opposing logical tendencies, if any, 
not for the purpose of deciding the facts, as we 
Inay do in equity cases, but to determine whether 
or not the trial court erred in its application of 
fixed legal principles. "'' ~~ "' * 
'' * "" * * If the evidence, taken as a whole, be 
reasonably susceptible of opposite conclusions as 
to the existence or non-existence of an ultimate 
fact, depending upon inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, or the weight to he given to the testi-
mony of this or that witness, or set of witnesses, 
we must conclusiv·ely presume the fact to be such 
as will support the ruling which we are called 
upon to review; but, if, after giving due con-
sideration to the fact that the trial judge is better 
able to weigh conflicting evidence, the evidence 
be such nevertheless as to impel but one reason-
able conclusion, and that as to a fact adverse to 
the ruling, it would be our duty to so declare, not-
withstanding there might be some conflict in the 
evidence.'' See also Jensen vs. Logan City, supra. 
We will now endeavor to show that the verdict of 
the jury was against i:he overwhelming weight of the evi-
dence. In making this statem·ent, defendants do not wish 
to be understood as asserting that plaintiff, his Wife and 
aunt did not testify that the accident ,was caus·ed by de-
fendants. We propose to show, however, why this testi-
mony was of such little weight that the trial court erred 
in refusing to grant a new trial because of the insuf-
ficiency of evidence to justify the verdict . 
• 
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"\Ye preface our argument on this point by stating 
were this a case in which the conflicting statements of 
witnesses were alone to be consider-ed, ~e r·ecognize that 
our proposition would be difficult to maintain. This, 
however, is a case where the insufficiency of. I?laintiff's 
eYidenee is den10nstrated by the physical facts which 
are uncontroverted. The evidence of plaintiff and his 
witnesses, when exan1ined in the light of the uncon-
troverted physical facts, could not be true. The two 
could not have co-existence. It is our contention that 
~tatements which fly in the face of established physical 
fact n1ust be disregarded as evidence. 
In Haarstrich vs. 0. 8. L., 70 Utah 552, 262 Pac. 
100, this rule has been recognized by this court. In that 
case it was argued that the testimony of a certain wit-
ness supported a verdict in plaintiff's favor. This court, 
however, held that the .testimony of the witness in ques-
tion should be entirely disregarded. The rule was an-
nounced in this language: 
"* * * * It only need be stated here that the 
testimony of Mr. Howlett in that. respect flies 
in the face of uncontroverted phy~ical facts and 
therefore is not substantial evidence *' * * '.' 
It was held in that case that defendant was entitled to 
a new trial. 
The statem·ent of the rule now leads us to consider 
the physical fiwts of this case which we deem to be 
uncontroverted. The physical evidences which show un-
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erringly where upon the highway the accident actually 
occurred are the following: 
1. The right wheel marks 1nade by the truck upon 
the right shoulder of the highway from the southwest 
corner of' the bridge, in unbroken continuity to the place 
where defendant's truck came to rest in the right barrow 
pit. These wheel marks were positiv·ely identified by de-
fendant Rogers and by Officers Reese and Gray (Tr. 
202, 233-236, 239, 253, 254, 260, 261, 263, 264). The exist-
ence and identification of these tracks was not seriously 
challenged by plaintiff. 
2. The location of the debris deposited upon the 
center of the highway by the collision ('Tr. 230, 231, 232, 
246, 248, 249, 2'62, 263). ·There is no ·evidence in the rec-
ord which shows that this debris was not deposited ex-
actly where defendant Rogers and the two police officers 
said it was. 
3. The po~ition of plaintiff's automobile after the 
accident in the approximate center of the highway with 
the left front wheel extending two to three feet over the 
center line (Tr. 181, 182, 189, 202, 229, 230, 262). All of 
these facts show that 'the collision did not occur upon 
plaintiff's side of the highway. 
It is true that plaintiff produced witnesses who testi-
fied of physical facts which were calculated to support 
plaintiff's theory of the accident. The basis of this testi-
mony was destroyed, however, by uncontroverted testi-
mony which proved that the observations upon which the 
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tt:>~tiinony was based rested upon false assumptions of 
fact. 
The witnesses Blaine l\Ioser, I-Iickn1an, l\lcl\lurdie 
and Haws went upon the scene of the accident the morn-
ing following its occurrence. It was their purpose to 
prove that defendants caused the accident. They first 
located the pile of debris upon the easterly shoulder of 
the highway. Immediately they adopted the theory that 
this pile of debris marked the spot where the collision 
had occurred. \Yith this false assumption finnly im-
planted in their minds .these witnesses proceeded to 
look for other indicatio~s of the place of in1pact. They 
a3~ert that they saw wheel 1narks upon the highway 
which seemed to them to point in the direction of defend-
ant's truck. They put the two assumptions together and 
can1e to the conclusion that the accident occurred on the 
easterly side of the highway (Tr. 72, 75, 79, 105, 106, 
111, 148, 150, 151, 154, 159, Ex. "D," 160, 165, 167, 169, 
170). 
That the first of these assumptions was false was 
established by the uncontroverted testh:nony of the high-
way officers that they had the night before removed the 
debris from the point of impact in the middle of the 
road to a place near the southeast edge of the highway. 
Another assumption of the same witnesses with respect 
to tire marks on the highway was likewise completely 
destroyed by uncontroverted evidence. They saw tire 
marks across the highway and laboring under the false 
assun1ption that the collision occurred where the officers 
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had deposited the debris they concluded the tire marks 
had been n1ade by defendant's truck. But they were look-
ing at tire marks which had been made by heavy road 
equipment when it backed across the highway in pulling 
defendant's truck upright before plaintiff's witnesses 
ever arrived upon the scene. 
Furthermore, several vehicles were at the scene of 
the accident im1nediately after it happened, and many 
more must have gone by between the time of the acci-
dent and the arrival of plaintiff's witnesses (Tr. 230, 
232, Ex. "D," 246, 247, 249, 262, 263, 205, 237, 238, 260, 
244, 228, 185) . 
The record shows that plaintiff's witnesses failed to 
identify with any certainty whatever the wheel marks 
which they say were to be seen the following day upon 
the highway as having been made by defendant's truck. 
They were content to assume that because the tire marks 
pointed in the general direction of defendant's truck this 
was sufficient proof that they had been made by the 
truck. They did not examine the tire n1arks they saw and 
cmnpare them \vith tires on the truck to make certain 
that they were the same. Nor did they follow them all 
the way across the highway from the debris to the truck 
itself. On the other hand, defendant Rogers and two of 
the police officers made certain that the tire tracks which 
they discovered upon the right shoulder of the highway 
had been made by the truck by making careful com-
parison between those tire marks and the tires on the 
truck and by following the marks to the truck. This 
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c\·idenrl~ i:-; not controverted ( Tr. 20~, 233 to 236, 253, 
.)~ I •) '') •)t' ') 
_,)-t, _U\ -- )-t • 
In addition to the testimony of Blaine :Moser, Hick-
umn, :Jic:Jiurdie and Haws being contrary to the phy-
sical facts of the accident, these state1nents contain glar-
ing inconsistencies in and of themselves. These witnesses 
speak of finding· skid 1narks upon the highway. 'They 
undertook to identify them in Exhibit "D." In this they 
failed. That there were none is conclusively shown (Tr. 
231). Xeither driver testified that brakes were applied 
at all. 
Blaine :Jioser made the assertion that the wheel 
1uarks which he believed but did not establish were made 
by the truck, left the highway at a 60 degree angle ( Tr. 
18). The uncontroverted evidence shows that the truck 
was almost exactly parallel with the highway when it 
came to rest. If the truck had left the highw~y at the 
acute angle of 60 degrees after having been struck by 
the plaintiff's automobile and was from then on out o"f 
control, it is not to he presumed that it would have com·e 
to rest in a position parallel to the highway. 
There was a reason why Blaine Moser and plaintiff's 
other witnesses attempted to establish an acute angle 
for the truck to leave· the highway. It was consistent with 
the statements made by plaintiff, his wife and aunt for 
them to do so. The latter three witnesses were claiming 
that defendant's truck attempted to get out of the path 
of plaintiff's car by swerving at an extremely acute 
angle. There was no proof submitted to show that the 
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truck could possibly have been driven so as to do this 'in 
the time and space r·equired 'by plaintiff's testimony. The 
maneuver described would have had to be executed within 
the space of 60 feet ( Tr. 61, 62, Ex. "F "). We assert that 
it was an utter impossibility for it 1:o have done so. Ftlr-
thermore, the record shows that there was no positive 
identification of the wheel. marks supposedly seen upon 
the highway with the truck itself. We have pointed out 
that the record in this respect shows that Blaine :Moser, 
Hickman, McMurdie and Haws only stated that these 
wheel marks went in the direct~on of the truck. It is 
without dispute that a heavy truck backed across the 
highway. Any wheel marks that may have been seen 
crossing the highway must have be·en those made by the 
heavy road ·equipment which was ba'cked across the 
highway in pulling the truck chassis upright. 
Mrs. Jones, plaintiff's aunt, had her eyes shut until 
just a split s·econd before the actual impact occurred 
·which renders any statement of hers with respect to loca-
tion of the vehicles upon the highway- extremely unre-
liable. Mrs. Jones testified on rebuttal upon direct ex-
amination by plaintiff's counsel as follows: 
'' Q~ Will you state to the court and jury as neur , 
as you can, what ~e (Edwards) said to you 
and what you said t.o hin1r 
A. He asked m·e what happened, and I said I 
didn't know what happrened. I knew I saw 
this bill board directly in front of us. Pre-
vious to that I didn't know." (Tr. 282-283) 
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Plaintiff's statement described something which was 
an impossibility. He states that he was within a foot or 
two of the easterly side of the highway when the col-
lision occurred (Tr. 36). Yet after the collision plaintiff's 
car was almost exactly in the center o£ the highway with 
its front end over the center line. If, the impact had oc-
curred where plaintiff claims· it did then his car would 
have been on the extreme easterly side of the highway 
and not in the middle of it where it was found after the 
collision. Furthermore he asserted he was but 60 feet 
:from the truck when it abruptly came over onto his side 
of the highway. At his speed ~f 45 miles per hour and 
the truck's speed of 40 miles per hour, the truck could 
never have been maneuvered in such a way as to get the 
front end of it out of the way before the impact. Yet the 
front end of the truck was undamaged and it is admitted 
by ·everyone that the impact came just in front of the 
left rear dual wheels of the truck ( Tr. 35, ·5'7, 58, 6'2, 
202, Ex. "B"). The impossibility of what plaintiff de-
scribes is further emphasized by the fact that no brakes 
were applied on either vehicle. Add to this the "foggy" 
condition of plaintiff's memory (Tr. 145) and what have 
you left of what could be described as a substantial con-
flict of ·evidence~ On the condition of plaintiff's memory 
we believe we may fairly add that either he could have 
no clear memory of the ev;ents of the accident or else 
the condition of his m·e~ory was misrepresented in order 
ro enhance his damages, and either way you take it, this 
testimony is extr·emely questionable. 
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There remains only the testimony of plaintiff's wife 
to consider on this aspect of the case. She loyally repeats 
the statement of her husband, the plaintiff, that the 
truck just before the accident did just what plain-
tiff said it did, and that plaintiff was on his side of the 
highway. As she describes it (Tr. 8'7) the truck swerved 
so sharply that the body would have been nearly at right 
angles to plaintiff's automobile. Indeed it presented for 
all the world the appearance of a "sign boar~" (Tr. 
87, 94, 95). We also question Mrs. Moser's ability to make 
accurate observation. Mrs. Moser was knocked at least 
partially unconscious, for she says: 
'' There was a terrific crash and I pulled 
my hand toward my face and there was a terrific 
impact. The last thing I remember I had a severe 
bump on the back of my head. I was lying out-
side of the car on the roadway. * * * * Things 
were a little vague because I had a terrific blow." 
(Tr. 87-88) 
Is it unreasonable to assume that she was in such 
an upset hysterical condition as to be incapable of care-
ful and correct obsel"vations. In addition, the natural 
temptation for Mrs. Moser to be biased n1ust not be 
overlooked. 
In awarding plaintiff a verdict the jury ignored not 
only evidence of physical facts which proved beyond 
doubt that defendants were not at fault and that con-
versely the plaintiff's conduct was the cause, or at the 
very least the contributing cause, of the accident, but 
also the inconsistencies and 1nistaken assu1nptions of 
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plaintiff and his witnesses, and rendered their verdict 
entirely out of syn1pathy for the plaintiff. 
\Ye earnestly belieYe that in the furtherance of 
justice a new trial n1ust be granted. 
A~signment of Erro.r Xo. 2: 
\Ye desire to but briefly state defendants' position 
''~ith respect to this assignment of error. It is a well 
recognized rule of law which we believe requires no 
citation of authority that defendants wer,e entitled to 
have the jury fully instructed upon all matters of law 
pertaining to this case. By refusing to give defendants 
requested instruction No. 1, the court committed error, 
because the court by so refusing did not instruct upon 
a legal proposition pertaining to the case which ,was of 
material importance. By said request, the court was 
asked to instruct the jury that defendants were not re-
quired to make any explanation of how or why the ac-
cident in this case occurred and to further instruct the 
jury that the burden was upon plaiutiff to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the collision resulted 
because of defendants' negligence. The latter part of 
this instruction was substantially given by the court, but 
the first part of it was not given as requested, nor was 
it given in substance. It is submitted that this request 
was a proper statement of the law and that it had ap-
plication to this case. It was not a mere abstract state-
ment of a legal principle. The jury could not have been 
misled hy giving it, and it clarified the instruction on 
the burden of proof. 
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As a corollary to the instruction that the burden 
was upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the collision in this case was caused by 
defendants' negligence, defendants were entitled to have 
the ju~y instructed that it was not incumbent upon them 
to give any explanation for the happening of the ac-
cident. The purpose of such an instruction was to make 
it perfectly clear to the jury that no inferences of any 
kind were to be indulged by the jury against the de-
fendants in the event the jury was not fully satisfied 
as to what caused the accident. 
The following cases contain examples of instruc-
tions similar to the 6ne requested by defendants which 
have had approval by the courts. In Doherty vs. St. Louis 
Butter Oomparny, !.Hssouri 98, ·S.W. 2d 7 42, the following 
instruction was held to be proper: 
'' * * * * It does not devolve upon the defend-
ant to dispr:ot:e said charge (of negligence), but 
rather the law casts the burden of proof in refer-
ence to said charge upon the plaintiff and said 
charge of negligence must be sustained by the 
preponderance, that is, the greater weight of the 
credible evidence, to the satisfaction of the jury. 
* * * *" 
Likewise in the case of Sullivan vs. J.l!inne·apolis 
Ry. Co., ~finn. 220 N.W. 922, an instruction in substance 
the same as the one r·equested by defendants, was held 
to be proper. It was stated in the following language: 
''Negligence is neyer pr·esumed · the burden 
of proof in this case is on plaintiff t~ prove by a 
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fair preponderance of the evidence, both the 
neg·ligence of the defendant and the mnount and 
seriousness of her injuries. The defendant never 
has to disprore negli.gcnoe; that is, the burden 
of proof, as I have already explained, is on plain-
tiff to show negligence.'' 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case shows conclusively that 
plaintiff was injured in a collision with defendant's 
truck because he drove his automobile on the wrong 
side of the highway. There is no substantial evidence that 
::;upports any of the charges of negligence made against 
defendants. 
Because the verdict of the jury is not supported by 
the evidence, and because the trial court committed error 
in (lenying defendants' motion for new trial based upon 
newly discovered ,evidence and insufficiency of evidence 
to support the verdict and in refusing to give defendants' 
requested instruction No. 1, the judgment of the trial 
court should be reversed . and defendant should be 
awarded a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QIDNNEY & NEBEKER, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and A ppelZants 
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